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Abstract 
 
The goal of the paper is to depict the international responsibility of state as the closest link to the core, 
axiology and teleology of the international law. The concept of international responsibility could be 
interpreted as an inter-phase, a stadium between the state sovereignty in internal sense, on one hand and the 
ultimate goal of realistically feasible implementation of the principles  of the international law, saliently with 
coercion (as a paramount hierarchical level), on the other. The focus would be on the actions, capacities and 
attributes of state as an active and passive subject of paramount significance in the establishment of 
international legal touchstones for its international responsibility, as well as on the contextual correlation 
among the international community, the state and specific international legal subsystems. The issue of 
quantification of the gravity of the wrongfulness of the act is essential for differential determination of the 
international responsibility of state.  
 
Key words: International responsibility of state; international law; international subject; sovereignty; 
coercion mechanisms. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The evolutionary level of human consciousness indicates tendency towards 
behavior inspired by individual or joint interests, despite the ideal vision that entails 
voluntary fulfillment of obligations, compromise and bona fide relations and in that context 
the international law is forced to confine itself within the limits of the notions of coercion 
with the purpose of enactment of legal obligations and relations, as a historical-
evolutionary imperative, all the while the possibility to engage the alternative types of 
coercive law-abidance is minimal. Primarily, the national states dispose of these executive 
organs and instruments that can carry out coercive measures, yet still the international legal 
system lacks such (organs and instruments) despite the options for enforcement of 
economic, political and military sanctions in certain circumstances upon certain subjects 
and states that had undertaken an international obligation and have breached it. In this 
context, the term “lacks” alludes once again to the confinement of the concept regarding the 
role of the state, its sovereignty and subsequently, its competencies, power and action areas, 
so the fulfilling of the international legal obligations undertaken is viable exclusively 
through the instruments and organs of a particular state as a direct regulator and enforcer. 
On the other hand, coercive mechanisms on the international scene that have evolved from 
various communities, organizations, as well as from variety of ideological, but also from 
pragmatical proveniences do exist and their development is a vivid process. Their spectral 
manifestations are also remarkable, ranging from an embargo, other types of economic 
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pressure, diplomatic note and pressure, abolishment of multi-resource aid for developing 
countries, financial penalties, international organization membership suspension etc. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of these mechanisms also derives from the subject and the 
attributes of the state. 
 The theoretical, scientific disputes and opposite opinions regarding the issue of the 
quality of the effects and results of the international legal system, especially the ones that 
challenge the purpose and the effectiveness of the international law, find their place in the 
holistic picture of its interpretation, but their significance is diminished when brought at the 
junction with reality and the non-existent alternatives for regulating human relations and 
processes on a global level, aiming to providing general legal certainty. Still, even in a 
flawed, not perfect form, the existence of international legal system is necessary as an 
evolutionary phase which in perspective and as developing trend contains greater 
unification of global legal rules referring to numerous and layered social, economic and 
purely legal areas, as well as intensified cooperation among states, international 
organizations and other subjects emerging on the international scene. 
 The international responsibility of state is the closest link to the core and teleology 
of the international law and the establishment of an international legal order, in general, as 
a global system for introducing functional rules for conduct of the international subjects. 
The concept of international responsibility could be interpreted as a stadium between the 
internal law and state sovereignty in internal sense, on one hand and the ultimate goal of 
realistically feasible implementation of the principles of the international law, saliently with 
coercion (as a paramount hierarchical level), on the other. Namely, the international 
responsibility represents a stepping stone towards the ultimate point of the international law 
and international legal system, yet it does not represent this point per se. The ultimate issue 
and salient problem is the issue of the enforceability of international law, while the rules on 
international responsibility define the fundament for its establishment and as such represent 
an inter-phase, and based on such establishment of this category, foremost theoretically and 
normatively, then concretely and operationally, from case to case, the parameters of 
applicability and enforceability in this legal-political area will be defined, differentiating 
among each other by time, subjects and modi. 
 This field is vast and leaves space for a more holistic analysis or for deepening into 
some of the aspects – therefore, only several aspects are chosen, mainly to accentuate the 
role of the state and the position of the concept of responsibility of state in the 
developmental dynamics of the axiological, but also of the pragmatic teleology of the 
international law. 
 
CODIFICATION AND LEVEL OF GENERALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE 
 
 The rules referring to the whole problematic of state responsibility have gradually 
developed throughout previous decades, but the firm establishment of this concept with 
strictly defined core is a recent phenomenon in the international law. The inception of the 
defining of the concept of responsibility of state is in 1928 when the Permanent Court for 
International Justice, in the Chorzov case points out that “as principle of the international 
law, the breach of each legal obligation means responsibility for repairment of the 
damage.” (Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 120). The 1929 Harvard Draft Research for 
Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Persons or Property of 
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Foreigners is one of the first proposed codifications of the law of state responsibility, yet 
with modest scope. (Crawford 2015, 32).  
 Despite the international legal stand-points that promote reciprocity of rights and 
duties either among clusters of associated states or of states and international organizations, 
the international law has evolved in direction of acceptance of the multilateralism and 
global public interests, specifically the interests of the international community as a whole, 
for which the endeavors and stances of the International Law Commission have their merits 
in the area of responsibility and finding a regime for implementation of the interest of the 
international community as a whole. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 7). State responsibility is one 
of the first fourteen areas, originally chosen by the ILC for the ‘codification and 
progressive development.’ The preparation of current acts regarding this matter has lasted 
for decades, resulting in several documents, out of which the key one is the Resolution 
56/83 for International Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (further 
on, Resolution 56/83), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2001. The ideological 
creator of the Draft-articles on international responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful acts –  the ILC, as well as the UNGA, through stipulation and transposition of 
these articles into the final end act – the Resolution 56/83 adopted on 12.12.2001, have 
become teleological determined for on one hand minimalistic, and on the other, unifying 
definition of state responsibility, thus establishing the ground standards for a steady 
formulation of previously undefined legal matter. They establish the general principle, 
while its elaboration is left to other numerous documents and areas of international law. By 
the commitment for unification of the definition of international responsibility of state, the 
ILC directly affects the world’s perception for state responsibility. This intention receives 
its confirmation also when the General Assembly in an unusual manner launches this 
resolution, recommending it to the UN member states, regardless of their intention for its 
formal ratification and implementation in the internal, domestic legal systems. 
 Naturally, the question of justification of the generality of Resolution 56/63 
contents poses itself, but in this case the automatic acceptance of the attribute ‘generality’ 
would be the adequate approach, for the sake of the principle of sovereignty of states and 
the objective development and position of the circumstances in the international law, from 
which this generality stems immanently. Namely, it represents a part of the secondary rules, 
which means it sets the concept of the state responsibility in a more generalizing manner, 
setting it on a level of principle, while the particular modi, types of breaches of 
international law, as well as the concrete sanctions are stipulated in detailed legal acts. For 
instance, the obligation to prosecute and punish individuals, including state officials 
(normally, ultimately connected to the establishment of state responsibility), is primarily a 
matter of primary rules, as well as the greatest number of legal acts that entail individual 
responsibility implicate state’s obligation to prosecute. (Nollkaemper 2009, 17). The 
correlation between the action capacitiy of the international community, the state and 
particular international legal sub-systems is complementary to some extent, but these 
capacities can be in a conflict among themselves as well, which inevitably generates the 
necessity of generalitzation of the unifying document – Resolution 53/63.  
 The entirity of the legal process when determining state responsibility, its legal 
consequences and their legal effectualisation, which contains several elements including 
which would the primary rules be, which lex specialis would be applied, before which 
organ or institution would the process be conducted, which would the involved subjects be, 
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the issues related to legal remedies, periods, contents of the final decisions etc., depend on 
the particular international legal sub-system. Certainly, after the point of determining 
certain state’s responsibility, the particular international system has the advantage in terms 
of enforcement of institutional decisions because of the more elaborate or effective 
coercion mechanisms it disposes of. That is the substantial functional aspect. Even 
formally, in terms of operative applicability, Article 55 of the Resolution 56/83 provides 
priority application of lex specialis stemming from international legal rules (UNGA 
Resolution 56/83, Art. 55), vis-à-vis this Resolution which is treated as lex generalis. An 
excellent, noticeable, highly functional, influential, even value-generating example for such 
advantage referring to the implementation is the functioning symbiosis of the European 
Court for Human Rights, based on the European Convention for Human Rights and the 
actions of the signatory states of this document. The international economic organizations 
have this kind of advantage as well, because their substance is constituted of more easily 
quantifiable relations. 
 
CURRENT CONCEPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE 
 
 The international responsibility of state is a reflection of the limitation of external 
state sovereignty, in terms of establishing international responsibility when a state commits 
an internationally wrongful act, i.e. when it breaches an obligation undertaken with a treaty 
while causing loss or damage to another state. (Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 122). 
 Precondition for the existence of the concept of international responsibility of state 
is the principles related to the notions of state sovereignty and equality of states. 
(Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 122). The current document from which this definition 
originates is the aforementioned Resolution 56/83, so the analysis of the concept of 
international state’s responsibility could be greatly identified with the analysis of this 
particular document. In this respect, a segmented review of the initial definition is 
necessary, while the order of the elaborated category is not indicative for its gravity or 
significance. Primarily, a review of the state as a subject of the international law then 
determining international responsibility of state would take place, as well as a review of the 
wrongfulness of the acts, their effects and time of performance. 
    
  The state as a subject of the international law 
 
 In a structurarily complex and multilevel international system of numerous 
relations, circumstances and processes, the regulation of the most of the aspects of the 
international responsibility is necessary. The Resolution 56/83 refers exclusively to the 
responsibility of the state as a unitary, monolithic, sovereign subject, but the progressive 
normative efforts are evident in the tendencies of the ILC and its 2011 Draft-Articles for 
international responsibility of international organizations (further on: 2011 Draft-
articles), as well. The perspectives of the international law incorporate re-conceptualization 
of specific categories and rights for particular participants on the international scene (such 
as the physical persons and the international organizations), especially in the human rights 
area in the international law or in some international institutional systems such as the legal 
and political system of the EU etc. Still, this paper would elaborate and focus on the 
actions, capacities and attributes of state as an active and passive subject in the 
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establishment of international legal touchstones for its international responsibility. Today, 
this basic rule can be found in the Resolution 56/83, where it is set down as a general 
principle by the Article 1 which provides: “every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.” (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 1) 
Furtheron in the same Resolution, Article 4 determines the definition of an act of a state, 
which is ‘the conduct of any legislative, executive or judicial organ of any state, whatever 
its character as an organ of the central or of the local government, whose status as  a state 
organ is determined according to the internal law of the state. (UNGA Resolution 56/83, 
Art. 4).  In the next several articles the modi of various subjects’ actions on behalf of the 
state are précised.  The state will bear responsibility exclusively for the conduct of the 
organ or the official of the state that originates from its prerogatives when exercising its/his 
state authority, not including these acts in the private sphere. The international 
responsibility established with this Resolution refers exclusively to the states as equal 
subjects in the international law, but not to individuals and other subjects, despite the fact 
that the individual responsibility determined contrary to that state’s knowledge or the scope 
of competencies that have been vested in that individual by the state, can exist alongside 
with the vicarious responsibility of the state. (Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 127). 
 Taking into consideration that the responsibility of the international organizations is 
separate, equally complex thematic, in function of the focus topic, the attention will be kept 
exclusively to the rules coming from the 2011 Draft-articles that treat the subject of the 
state when determining its international responsibility. Namely, in these Draft-articles as 
counterparts of the Resolution 56/83 provisions, in the most general manner and completely 
in the spirit of the above mentioned resolution, the international responsibility of the state is 
brought in correlation with an internationally wrongful act connected with the conduct of 
an international organization. (ILC DARIO 2011, Art. 1, Par. 2). More precisely, the 
articles 58-62 of the 2011 Draft-articles for responsibility of international organizations by 
the ILC regulate this matter, but of particular significance for defining the distinction 
between the subjectivity of these two types of entities (the state and the international 
organization) are the Articles 59, 61 and 62 because they infer to the nature of these 
subjects, their inter- relations, simultaneously involving the concept of the state’s 
sovereignty in contemporary terms – concept of a relative, i.e. non-absolute sovereignty of 
state, based on the Weber’s definition, yet distanced from it, as well as the differentiated 
leveling of the sovereignty between the member-states and the international organization, 
depending on the constitutive provisions and legal acts of the respective international 
organization. For instance, Article 59 of the 2011 Draft-articles provisions that the state that 
directs and controls an international organization in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act done by the latter is internationally responsible for that act if the state has 
done it with knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act. (ILC DARIO 2011, Art. 
59). Article 61 Paragraph 1 of the 2011 Draft-articles stipulates that “a state member of an 
international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the 
fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the 
State’s international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization 
to commit and act that, if committed by the state, would have constituted a breach of that 
obligation.” (ILC DARIO 2011, Art. 61) The plurality of responsible subjects could be 
brought into this context, stipulated in the Article 48 of the 2011 Draft-articles, stating that 
when an international organization and one or more states or other international 
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organizations are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of 
each state or organization may be invoked in relation to that act. (ILC DARIO 2011, Art. 
48).  
On the other hand, the responsibility in case of hypothetically possible overlapping 
of the effective control of the state and the international organization is regulated, as well – 
according to Article 7 of the 2011 Draft-articles, “the conduct of an organ of a state that is 
placed at the disposal of an international organization shall be considered under 
international law as an act of the organization that exercises effective control over that 
conduct.” (ILC DARIO 2011, Art. 7). With this provision an elementary distinction is made 
between the act of the state and the act of the international organization that had had at its 
disposal the state’s organ or official, which would be basis for further determination of the 
distinction between the competencies and subsequently, the responsibilities of these two 
international legal subjects. 
 
Quantifying the gravity of wrongfulness of the act and the inflicted damage 
 
 The characterization of an act of a state as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law, irrespective by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal 
law. (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 3). The differentiation between grave (systemic and 
grave breach of jus cogens) and “regular” breach of international law, i.e. breach of an 
international obligation, opens space for quantitative and qualitative distinction when 
setting down the consequences of the respective wrongful act. 
 At a previous point in time, the ILC thought the difference ought to be expressed as 
one between serious breaches, labeled “crimes” and ordinary breaches, labeled “delicts”, 
but the terminology that classifies an act in a criminal category remained subject of 
controversial debates which have prevented the ILC from discussing the implications of the 
crime-delict dichotomy. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 17). In other words, the general manner 
of formulation is accepted, tied to a previous legal-lexical international consensus referring 
primarily to the category jus cogens (with its fundaments in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties), but also concerning contextual definition of civic and criminal 
responsibility. To be emphasized, this generalizing formulation refers only to the 
international responsibility of the states, but not to the one of the international organizations 
and individuals, for which assignment of criminal act is possible. On the other hand, 
penalties of criminal legal nature are possible for the individuals that are in governing 
positions in the moment of the commission of the wrongful act of the state. According to 
the international law, usually the state, and not the individual is held responsible, but all 
combinations are possible, which means the individual can be held responsible, precluding 
state responsibility when state officials and citizens of a state commit internationally 
wrongful acts against the civil population, but a joint - state and individual responsibility 
can be invoked, as well. (Posner and Sykes 2006, 62). The standpoint of the ILC and 
subsequently of the UNGA, for serious breach of international obligation is reflected in its 
definition in Article 40 of the Resolution 56/83 where the gravity of the breach is 
differentiated according to whether a peremptory norm of jus cogens is breached, especially 
accentuated in situations when such breach is gross or systemic, i.e. perpetual. (UNGA 
Resolution 56/83, Art. 40). There are several legal situations that preclude the wrongful act, 
but under any circumstances, the compliance with the peremptory norms jus cogens must 
not be brought into question, especially taking in consideration that in the Resolution 56/83 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 1, No. 2, 2015 | UDC 327 | ISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies – Bitola at www.e-jlia.com 
            
7 
 
there are several provisions stipulating that the obligations of the responsible state (the state 
responsibility) might concern or to be owed to the whole international community (erga 
omnes), which means that the occurrence of legal situations with greater gravity of state 
responsibility is possible and that these are connected to the legal interest of all the 
countries because of its jus cogens concerning, which raises other questions presented 
further in the paper. The tight conceptualization of the category ‘serious breach’, mainly 
because of the relatively mild and vague consequences could be subjected to criticism that 
it disavows the contents and the gravity of this type of breach. In this context the effects of 
the countermeasures are inevitable to mention. The countermeasures as form of acting that 
precludes the wrongfulness of the act do not have a retributive aim and the tendency of the 
international law rhetoric is to reduce or disregard the pejorative title “retorsion”. Two 
principles established with the Resolution 56/83 clash – the possibility of every state to 
invoke responsibility if the wrongful act concerns fundamental values of the international 
community formulated in the peremptory norms and the possibility to use countermeasures 
as a valid instrument for making a point internationally. Although it is accepted that in 
order the state’s responsibility to exist, previous breach of international obligation must had 
occurred and damage (material or moral) must have been inflicted, there is still a vivid 
debate in legal theory regarding the measurement of the damage as a standard in 
international law (Crawford 2015, 58). Namely, in specific contexts the question is posed of 
whether any kind of damage is sufficient for such defining or is “significant” damage 
(Crawford 2015, 58) necessary, which would the parameters for determining significant 
damage be etc, but that is currently an open question in the science of international law. 
Still, certain international legal tendencies can be identified. Generally, overlooking or 
neglecting minor breaches, although unprincipled, it is in positive correlation to the level of 
globalization of the system and the central organizations constituted to regulate particular 
questions, in order to ensure relative stability in the relations between factors and subjects 
that are complex and leveled in their core; and not always consistent, principled reaction, 
even for the sake of correction of the breach of the obligation, is beneficial for the global 
and long-term picture of the relations. The damage must be proven by the damaged state, i. 
e. the burden of proof lies on the party that claims that a certain country should bear 
responsibility, but the problem is that such proof-providing might be difficult in numerous 
areas. Depending on the gravity of the accusation, the need for the solidity and 
conclusiveness of the proof varies accordingly, while the case gets exceptional gravity 
when a peremptory norm jus cogens is breached. (Shaw 2008, 567). Proving a causal link 
between the breach of the international obligation and the act of commission or omission 
itself is of essential importance for determining the state’s responsibility. There is a variety 
of international obligations from numerous fields in which the damage done to other states 
could not be expected, would be difficult to prove or is not the substance of the obligation. 
Such examples are several areas such as environmental protection, disarmament and other 
preventive obligations in the field of peace and security, but the most remarkable is the area 
of human rights, for which France has put a reserve on the Resolution 56/83. (Crawford 
2015, 57). The wrongfulness of the act is configured not just directly ex delictio, but also 
sine delicto, if concerning acts that are not de jure forbidden by international law, but from 
the substance of the circumstances and the context of the treaties regulating specific areas 
such as environmental conventions, it turns out that if damage to the environment is done 
and that reflects to other states, the state that has inflicted the damage will be held 
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internationally responsible. (Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 123). To emphasize that 
despite the invocation of the latter type of responsibility entails certain level of indirectness 
and implication, still, the international obligation itself must exist and the state that had 
undertaken it must have been bound itself or made that commitment before the moment of 
committing the wrongful act, in order a real state’s responsibility to be determined and not 
to charge a country retroactively, which as a legal principle is in function of legal certainty 
and  the rule of general international legality. To resume, even though secondary rules are 
in question, the concept of damage has room for legal concretization in direction of 
differentiation several types of damage by areas of legal regulation (environment, trade 
relations, criminal acts, etc.) with the possibility of emphasizing or defining exceptions for 
specific legal situations.  
    Setting the wrongful act of state in time 
 
 In order to establish the wrongful act, it is necessary for it to be brought in 
chronological correlation with the undertaking of the obligation. Article 13 of the 
Resolution 56/ 83 resolves this, by stipulating that “an act of a state does not constitute a 
breach of an international obligation unless the state is bound by the obligation in question 
at the time the act occurs.” (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 13). This article obviously is not 
explicitly formulated as a forbidden retroactivity, yet regardless of the form, the time 
positioning of the wrongful act and its correlation with the time of undertaking the 
obligation by the state points directly to the principle of forbidden retroactivity (forbidden 
enactment of norms with retroactive force, i.e. ex post facto laws). This principle is not 
necessary applicable to other international legal areas in general, because despite its 
recognition by the positive law of most of the civilized nations, this principle has relative 
nature in international law, is characterized with many exceptions and there is no rule of 
general customary international law forbidding the enactment of norms with retroactive 
force. (Frick and Oberprantacher 2009, 103). 
 
CONSEQUENCES FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE 
 
 The international law does not distinguish between contractual and tortuous 
responsibility, so that any violation by a state of any obligation of whatever origin gives 
rise to state responsibility and consequently to the duty of reparation (Shaw 2008, 567). 
The legal consequences that occur for the state that has done the wrongful act, do not 
release that state from the initial obligation (“do not affect the continued duty of the 
responsible state to perform the obligation breached”) (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 29), 
which means that the existence of legal consequences for breach of obligation is consistent 
and parallel to the duty of performing the obligation and is not mutually exclusive. The 
state responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under the obligation primarily to 
cease that act and to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. (UNGA 
Resolution 56/83, Art. 30). Furtheron, one of the forms of reparation takes place or certain 
combination of theirs. The responsible state is under the obligation to make full reparation 
for the injury (material and moral) caused by the internationally wrongful act. (UNGA 
Resolution 56/83, Art. 31). As a broader definition of the concept reparation is considered 
the statement of the Permanent Court for International Justice in Chorzow case, which is 
that “reparation must, as far as possible, annul all the consequences of the illegal act and 
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reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.” (ILC DARSWA commentaries 2001, 91). 
 There are three basic forms of reparations based on commission of internationally 
wrongful acts which are: restitution, compensation and satisfaction, but their combination is 
also possible. (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 34). Reparations may vary qualitatively, but 
they do not have retributive caracter. The priority is assigned to the restitution, i.e. returning 
to previous condition restitutio in integrum as far as possible, while the area that cannot be 
covered by the institution of restitution, compensation will be paid. (Ortakovski and 
Milenkovska 2014, 130) which entails paying damages for financially estimated damage, 
which on its own integrates the types damnum emergens and lucrum cesans. (UNGA 
Resolution 56/83, Art. 36). Restitution is relatively unattainable ideal situation, so the 
compensation is the most common form of reparation (Posner and Sykes 2006, 46). In the 
cases when the effect of the wrongful act cannot be repaired by restitution and/or 
compensation (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 39, Par. 1) and yet moral damage is inflicted 
by causing feeling of injustice, the reparation is performed in the form of satisfaction, 
which means with public acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, formal 
apology or a promise that the wrongful act will not be repeated. (Ortakovski and 
Milenkovska 2014, 131). A viable option is the combination of these types of reparation, as 
well, which is due to the fact that simultaneous or paralel, or intertwined infliction of 
material and moral damage is possible. A specified type of consequences that originate 
from the gross injury of the peremptory norms envisaged in the Article 40 of the Resolution 
56/83 and serve as a corrective of such injury, are the ones provisioned with article 41 of 
the Resolution 56/83 – cooperation among states based on lawful means, directed towards 
cessation of the gross injury; then, prohibition both for recognizing a situation as lawful if it 
is created by a serious breach and for rendering aid or assistance in maintaining that 
situation. Key for this point is the Paragraph 3 of the Article 41, according to which the 
former acts or restrains are without prejudice to other consequences envisaged for the 
breach of the international obligation. (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 41). This kind of 
narrow conceptualization of possible reactions in these articles infer to the point that for a 
gross injury, there is no substantial consequences of appropriate nature or of greater 
gravity, because the provisioned consequences even for cases of grave injury are still within 
the confines of the reparations, cessation of the  wrongful act etc, but the real difference can 
be detected in the fact that third countries that are not directly injured, are not only given 
the possibility, but are obliged to react and not to be passive bystanders. (Tams and Asteriti 
2013, 17), i.e. to polarize and effectuate their attitude towards the wrongdoers that breach 
international obligations that derive from jus cogens. Still, with such position, these 
obligations for third countries are vague, with level of ambiguity and lack of definition, 
which naturally, would subsequently reflect on an irregular or inconsistent empirical 
implementation. 
 
PROCESSING, EFFECT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE 
 
The relation, interdependence and apparent differences between the domestic and 
international law find their place in the problematic concerning responsibility of state - in 
the defining or establishing certain acts and their characteristics as wrongful according to 
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international substantial law, as well as in the procedural issues such as the effect of the 
norms and application of legal remedies. The former aspect is depicted in the Article 3 of 
the Resolution 56/83 according to which in a most general manner is envisaged that the 
characterization of an act of the state as an internationally wrongful one is regulated by the 
international law and is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law. (UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 3). Although many acts are considered as 
wrongful both according to international and domestic law, often the international law 
imposes obligations that do not exist under domestic law and the international remedy for 
harmful acts that violate international law is then exclusive. (Posner and Sykes, 25).  
 Still, when the treatment of the wrongful behavior is determined as such according 
to the domestic law, the problematic question for implementation and enactment of 
international law and the usage of international remedies is greatly absolved – in some 
cases explicitly, with the rules that stipulate necessary exhaustion of all domestic legal 
remedies before bringing the claim before international court such as the case with the 
preconditions for bringing a claim before the European Court for Human Rights, compliant 
with the Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, in some cases 
the necessity for previous exhaustion of domestic remedies is not explicitly mentioned, but 
is implied from the general principle of international customary law (Shaw 2008, 597) for 
exhaustion of domestic remedies and this principle is based on the core of the act itself, its 
regime according to domestic and international law and to the sub-system in international 
law according to which the regulations are applied. For instance, presumably such 
provision should be contained in the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, but such explicit formulations that regulate this issue do not exist – only 
remotely and indirectly can the intention of the legislator be identified by the fact that the 
Statute mentions the sources according to which the ICJ decides, such as international 
conventions, customs etc, so presumably the treatment of the issue concerning exhaustion 
of domestic remedies is contained in some specific sources. In practice, there are 
controversial stances and actions regarding this issue which bring into contradiction for 
example, the states sovereignty, the rules for state immunity, rules for priority of usage of 
remedies and the rules for state’s responsibility, especially in the cases when international 
criminal tribunals are established where this relation of the aforementioned constitutively 
complex aspects is an exceptional challenge to be resolved.     
 Anyhow, in the case of duality of remedies, internal and international, for the 
equally defined wrongful act, due attention should be paid to the stance that domestic 
remedies are superior for several reasons, but key is that the domestic legal systems dispose 
of greater coercive authority to enforce court decisions (Posner and Sykes 2006, 26) and of 
other procedural control mechanisms (for example, preliminary ensuring measures, etc.) 
The weaknesses of this standpoint are also insurmountable where special substance would 
be assigned to the argument of the subjective perception and the ethnocentric state interests 
when enacting the rules for responsibility of state, as well as the overlapping and 
contradiction of the rules for responsibility of state with the rule nemo judex in causa sua. 
Despite the complexity, the dichotomies and contradictions regarding this issue, the 
Resolution 56/83 in the Article 44 stipulates that the responsibility of state may not be 
invoked if the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies. 
(UNGA Resolution 56/83, Art. 44). 
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 The concepts erga omnes and jus cogens affect the application of international 
responsibility. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 27). Erga omnes concept has had an impact on the 
legal rules governing the implementation of responsibility. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 16). 
Influenced by the erga omnes concept, contemporary international practice has embraced 
different forms of “public interest enforcment” in response to breaches of fundamental 
obligations of international law. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 27). This has broadened the circle 
of states and international organizations, entitled to respond against an internationally 
wrongful act. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 27). The injured state has the option to choose to 
dismiss its right to invoke other state’s responsibility for injury of an erga omnes 
obligation, but the former state cannot inhibit other countries to bring such claims based on 
the Article 48 of the Resolution 56/83. 
 The initial open question referring to establishment of erga omnes principle in 
context of invocation of responsibility when peremptory norm is breached, after the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was whether the erga omnes principle would be 
applicable in practice, but the numerous cases throughout the years, until nowadays, have 
proven that the frequency of its referral is irrefutably functional. (Tams and Asteriti 2013, 
2). As far as the active legitimacy as a subject of discourse is concerned, it was mentioned 
that in the Resolution 56/83, the implementation of the peremptory norms was emphasized, 
through the provisions stipulating that the obligations of the responsible state, might affect 
the whole international community. Namely, when breach of a peremptory norm has 
occurred, legitimacy, i.e. the right to invoke responsibility, is assigned to any country, 
despite the fact that it hasn’t experienced direct legal consequence. This setting of the legal 
creator (the ILC and the UNGA) is also indicative for determination of hierarchy of legal 
acts and by that for the positioning of the legal rules concerning the responsibility of state. 
Although in the Resolution 56/83 is explicitly expressed the hierarchical superiority of lex 
specialis in relation to this legal act as lex generalis, the point that isn’t expressed and that 
we extrapolate of the overall international law, is that when an peremptory norm jus cogens 
is contained in a treaty, such treaty has the advantage. (Ortakovski and Milenkovska 2014, 
55) in comparison to these general rules for determining responsibility of state.  
 In practice, claims for responsibility are raised at many different levels of 
government, depending on their seriousness and on the general relations between the states 
concerned, moreover, the International Court of Justice has on occasion proved itself 
satisfied with rather more informal methods of  responsibility invocation. (Crawford 2015, 
68). The immunity of states, although by its contents originates from a fundamental 
principle – sovereign equality of states, practically represents a procedural impediment and 
is directly conflicted with the determination of state’s responsibility. Even though in the 
Resolution 56/83 the states’ immunity is implicitly waived when gross injury of jus cogens 
is concerned, still this remains an imprecise issue. The basic standpoint of the international 
law is that still, a general rule that would impose duty for immunity waiving does not exist, 
not even for the breaches of peremptory norms of international law (Tams and Asteriti 
2013, 22), but it is rather predictable that there is a possibility in future to introduce waiving 
immunity in order to process the problematic of the area of the peremptory norms. 
 In addition, the question regarding the effect from the determined international 
state’s responsibility over the implementation of such responsibility is set – more precisely, 
what the power of certain international institutions and factors in context of fragmented 
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system of international law to impose restitutive justice is. For completion of the depiction, 
the argumentation referring to fragmentation of international law and relations is intriguing. 
 Fragmentation is a subject to multi-aspect critiques and one of the main arguments 
is the fact that it represents an effect of the endeavors of the powerful international factors 
(states, trade subjects, international organizations of various nature and area) to preserve 
their position on the international legal and political scene as well as the possibility to 
influence all types of relations, processes and world trends (economic, social, military, 
peace-keeping, etc.).The arguments for this position are that this tendency for conserving 
the dominant position of some states and for diminishing the uniformity of the international 
law are directly affected by the negative effects of the fragmentation. (Benvenisti and 
Downs 2007, 596). The most remarkable effects of that kind would be: creation of narrow, 
functionalistic institutions with limited scope of multilateral agreements which leads to 
decreased possibilities for the weaker actors to connect on many common grounds, thus 
diminishing their influential potential, but ever-present is also the effect of the absence of 
ultimate goal, ambiguous or variable confines and overlapping jurisdictions that enable 
absolution from responsibility of the powerful states for various reasons. (Benvenisti and 
Downs 2007, 597). Certainly, the counterarguments are valid, as well, those being for 
example, the exponentially succecful regulatory coordination among institutions, the 
expression of international political pluralism and the possibility to achieve higher results 
in the development of the international law and politics through competitiveness. 
(Benvenisti and Downs 2007, 597). 
 The answer is compound. Still, the fragmentation is a result of objectively inevitable 
processes and circumstances. It is partially due to the small number of integrative, holistic 
treaties, in contrast to the greater number of agreements with specific purpose and narrower 
concept, directed towards regulating exclusive area, i.e. segmented regulating of particular 
types of relations. This international practice stems from pragmatical needs, which means 
for the sake of functionality of the most frequent international legal traffic – the 
international agreements in the field of economy and more concretely of the trade, 
reparation of damage, labor relations etc; it is necessary to currently activate the subjects 
and forecast specific circumstances, therefore logically the necessity for myriad of trade 
agreements arises. While on the other hand, the strategic agreements (treaties), especially 
the ones with integrative concepts and broader platforms, the ones with elements of 
constitutional nature, as well as the ones that do not have predecessor in the tradition of 
international cooperation of the particular subjects that are signatories or are involved in the 
concept of the treaty are fewer in number and are characterized with a level of abstraction, 
with the tendency to establish general axiological and legal principles. In these group of 
legal documents can be enlisted those that penetrate in the sphere of codification and 
progress of international law.  Hence, the realization of the responsibility of the state has 
multilateral and relative character, dependent on the international legal subsystem which 
infers to a direct causal link between the fragmentation and the concept of international 
responsibility of state. Exceptional primary factors of influence on the realization of such 
state’s responsibility, originating from fragmentation are: the enhanced success of dominant 
countries to proliferate and impose their own permanent interests as a negative point in 
correlation to the weaker subjects; but also, there is the factor of effectiveness of the 
instruments of the subsystems (as the case of ECtHR), as a positive one. These factors 
directly affect the undermining of the ILC efforts for uniformity and balanced concept of 
international responsibility of state. 
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CORRELATION BETWEEN THE STATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 
 
 Gradual introduction of activity and significance of non-state actors in the action 
mechanisms of the international law diminishes the importance of the exclusive subjectivity 
of state and attracts academic attention, yet still, the state has the pedestal in this sphere, so 
indubitably stirs the interest concerning its place in the development of public law regimes. 
 The concept of state responsibility in international law basically refers to the 
protection of public rights, but the states enter into contractual interactions both with 
physical and legal persons, thus penetrating into private rights and obligations, so the 
question is to what extent may these be protected under the rules of state responsibility? 
(Crawford 2015, 74). The acts of state can equally affect private as well as public rights, so 
the differences arise from the applicability and enforceability of the law. (Crawford 2015, 
74). Private rights can be elevated to the international level only if there is some special 
mechanism that converts the private law in public law (as in the case of diplomatic 
protection) or if a specific system or procedure is involved where jurisdiction of 
international court, arbitrage or tribunal is established (Crawford 2015, 74). In either case, 
the consent of the state against which enforcement of the private right is sought is to some 
extent required. (Crawford 2015, 75). 
 Another aspect that implies strong correlation between international and domestic 
public legal and political processes is the perspective according to which some cases of 
criminal acts of the state might lead to an obligation of the responsible state to change its 
domestic constitutional structure, to change its government, the constitution itself and to 
hold free elections in order to prevent the recurrence of criminal acts. (Nollkaemper 2009, 
27). The ratio behind this standpoint is solid. On the other hand, beside the fact that 
domestic changes would undermine or eventually remove causes of international crimes, 
the prevailing opinion would be that there is a lack of data of state practice that would 
prove the necessity of a causal link between the previous criminal acts and the 
constitutional changes. (Nollkaemper 2009, 27). 
 In summary, it can be concluded that regardless of the nature of the concerned right 
with international connotation regarding state responsibility, the participation of the subject 
of the state as medium is necessary, with its instruments and capacities, in order to directly 
establish or to influence the specific international legal situations, relations and processes. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 In conditions of the current international law system which is in a construction 
process, where numerous legal formulations are characterized with level of vagueness, 
ambiguity, generalization, even with dichotomies, and the ultimate instruments for 
implementation and coercion, which means consistent application of international law are 
greatly with problematic, disputable implementation and enforceability; the state’s 
responsibility is a concept closest to establishment of an international legal order which 
would be based on clear rules for action. State responsibility represents a link and inter-
phase between the state sovereignty and the teleology of international law and the 
establishment of the international legal order in general, as a global system for introducing 
functional rules of conduct of the international subjects. 
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 When determining the international responsibility of the state, the quantification of 
the wrongfulness of the act done by the state is achieved according to the rules of 
international law. The peremptory norms jus cogens are of exceptional significance and 
gravity – their character directly affects the determination of active legitimacy of other 
states as subjects of the international law, as well as the categorization of the level of injury 
done by the state, according to international law and this significance is of special extent in 
the context of non-existent distinction between criminal and tortuous responsibility. Still, 
the narrow conceptualization of the category gross injury, mainly because of the relatively 
mild and vague consequences should be subjected to critique that it disavows the contents 
and the gravity of this type of injury. In this context, although the Resolution 56/ 83 entails 
secondary rules, the notion of damage has space for legal concretization in direction of 
differentiation of several types of damage by areas of legal regulation (environment, trade 
relations, criminal acts, etc.), with the possibility to accentuate or define exceptions for 
specific legal situations. 
 Since the determination of international responsibility of the state is done according 
the rules of international law, it is theoretically independent or preclusive regarding the 
domestic law, but on the other hand its implementation is dependent of the capacities and 
the instruments of the state. As far as the duality of legal remedies, domestic and 
international, for the same wrongful act are concerned, the domestic ones are superior and 
the internal legal systems dispose of greater coercive authority and procedural control 
mechanisms for enforcing decisions. Yet, regardless of the nature of the relevant right with 
international connotation tied to the concept of state responsibility, the participation of the 
subject of the state as a medium is necessary, with its instruments and capacities in order to 
directly establish or to influence the specific international legal situations, relations and 
processes. Hence, the role of the state is paramount. The reason for this is the fact that the 
international community is still based on the classical-modern conceptions regarding the 
state, the sovereignty and international cooperation and not on the postmodernism.  
 Concurrent to the previous conclusion is the one that both the determination and the 
implementation and enforcement of the rules regarding international responsibility of state 
are directly subjected to the conditions of fragmentation of the system of international law. 
 An upside of the fragmentation is that it offers possibilities for regulation of certain 
areas of international legal traffic, thus creating a picture resembling climate of loyal 
competition in the economy. The negative implications are that the fragmentation only 
represents an opportunistic, alternative fashion of domination of world powers with the 
tendency of absorbing greater area of influence, in circumstances where the formal equality 
of states and the principle of respecting the state’s sovereignty do not allow  the great 
factors to aggressively impose their will in an unified international legal system, so they 
achieve their position by creation of stratum and functionalistic regulation of relations, 
where, in specific spheres they pose themselves as hegemons to a certain extent. From this 
second perspective, fragmentation gets pejorative attribute and we can conclude that it has 
negative influence on the uniformity and consistency of the concepts of certain categories 
of the international law. The legal systems vary in their contents and a unifying conception 
is necessary so that under equal circumstances, similar rights and obligations of same 
genesis should be realized. In this context, the UNGA and the ILC have made an effort for 
unification, if not for egalitarization of the definition of international responsibility of state 
by adopting general, secondary rules, thus affecting world’s perception for this concept; yet 
the enactment of the rules regarding the state’s responsibility is negatively influenced by 
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the fragmentation. On the other hand, the fragmentation offers benefits in terms of more 
effective operative instruments of some of the specific international legal subsystems, in 
comparison to what is offered by the general system of international law of the international 
community as a whole. 
 The correlation among the international community, the state and specific 
international legal subsystems are complementary to some extent and offer superior 
possibilities for international regulative and actionable coordination, but are also concurrent 
or in mutual conflict to some extent, which irrefutably generates the need for generality and 
unification of the legal documents and practice. 
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